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The European Crisis and Lessons from Latin America through the
Glass of Financialization and Austerity Measures
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Abstract: The scope of the current European crisis calls for a rereading of mainstream economic
theory. Europe is experiencing a “déjà vu” history through which Latin America has already lived.
The recurrent crises from the 1970s up to the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy are manifestations of the
financialization process and relate to its different facets. The objective of this article is to analyze
financialization in the current economic and financial crisis in Europe as well as its role in the Latin
American debt crisis. A heterodox perspective is necessary to understand this long process
of economic deterioration and discern the global fragility of the current financial system.
An explanation of the structural crisis in the Eurozone implies an understanding of the financial
and monetary agreements laid out in the Maastricht Treaty and the position of the Central Bank with
regard to financial markets. Today, financial investors have been especially attuned to interest rate
risks and profitability in the international financial system, in the same way that transnational banks
owned Latin American sovereign debt years before.
Keywords austerity measures; European and Latin American crises; financial crises; financialization
Austerity, initially a religious concept embodying the supreme virtue of renouncing
pleasures of worldly life to attain the joy of afterlife, was transmogrified into an economic
policy during the interwar period. It enshrines three principles or dogmas. I. The State must
impose a decrease in consumption to force a rise in saving because savings are automati-
cally transformed into investment, which is the sole source of growth. II. The State must
strive to cut its expenditures and raise taxes in order to get a full balanced budget or
a surplus. III. Austerity is imposed by the supreme law of scarcity, in which a choice
is forced to be made and there is no escape from it in the present or future.
—Alain Parguez, 2013
The Bretton Woods System that ended in 1971 represents the collapse of a regulated system that
gave way to the strengthening of financialization, which has exercised increasing control on
financing for development. The financialization process transferred activity from the real to
Alicia Girón is a researcher at the Economic Research Institute, National Autonomous University of Mexico
(UNAM). Marcia Solorza is a professor at the School of Economics, UNAM.
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the financial sector, with the latter becoming one of the key elements or the center of gravity
of contemporary economies. Financialization is a term that refers to the predominance
of institutional investors in the financial sphere over financial transactions with credits often
supported by central bank actions.1 Furthermore, financialization has been accompanied by
financial innovation whereby the banking model of “originating and distributing” credit and
risk rests with a range of financial products facilitating the creation of a speculative bubble
and crisis (Kregel 2008: 71).
The term financialization has been viewed from several perspectives. For Epstein financiali-
zation refers to the “increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors,
financial institutions and financial elites in the operation of national and international
economies” (Epstein 2005: 3), whereas Arrighi (1999: 7–8) identified long waves of economic
development in global capitalism that involve hegemonic and geographic shifts. Arrighi empha-
sized that economic deceleration phases generate a process of financialization characterized by
the leading power, initially with a competitive advantage in terms of production, shifting toward
financial activities as the growth regime is exhausted and other players catch up. Stockhammer
(2012: 45) states that financialization has deeply transformed developed economies and asserts
that the financialization concept comprises changes in the existing relation between the “real”
and “financial” system, giving more weight to financial motives and financial actors. Girón
and Chapoy (2012–13) describe financialization as relating to the buying and selling of assets
or financial securities that are transacted in the financial capital markets. The new joining of large
conglomerates contributed to the phenomenon through off-balance-sheet transactions with
derivatives or financial products and services that were the consequence of technological and
financial innovations. The financial intermediaries’ need for liquidity made it possible for the
securitization of assets to take on a life of its own in financial transactions (Girón and Chapoy
2012–13: 168). Finally, Palley defines financialization as a process whereby financial markets,
financial institutions, and financial elites gain greater influence over economic policy and
economic outcomes. Financialization transforms the functioning of economic systems at both
the macro and micro levels. These changes in macroeconomic models and policy objectives,
namely, the achievement of cost and, particularly, price stability, are attributable to the evolution
and dominance of the financial sector (Palley 2007: 2).
The depth of capital’s internationalization already in the postwar Bretton Woods monetary
system, up to 1971, established the subsequent path to the integration of international financial
circuits in the capitalist orbit across a finance-dominated regime of accumulation (also called
neoliberalism or financialization). Among its contradictions, we find income polarization and
the deterioration of real wages caused by financial and commercial globalization and also the
decline in trade union power. The latter is seen as one of the possible causes of the current
stagnation and fall in demand (Stockhammer 2012: 54–57).
To Minsky, this stage of capitalism is characterized by huge pools of funds under professional
management—pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, hedge funds, university endowments,
corporate treasuries, and so on. Every money manager was under pressure to exceed the average
return to retain clients, something that is, of course, not statistically possible collectively.
However, with such incentives and with virtually no government regulation, this encouraged
not only risky behavior but also ethically compromised actions.2 The growth in these
funds was caused by the success of earlier managerial welfare-state capitalism: the absence of
depressions and the presence of relatively good growth, because even when financial crises came
SPRING 2015 33
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along and wiped out some wealth, each crisis was contained so that most wealth survived and
growth could be quickly resumed. Particularly important was the dynamics created by the
transfer of power from banks to “money managers” of “shadow banks” (Wray 2012: 7).
NEW PLAYERS THROUGH THE LENS OF FINANCIALIZATION
Following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods Agreements in 1971, financial instability
became a constant feature of financial markets worldwide. In both developed and under-
developed countries, recurring monetary, banking, and financial crises persisted for more than
four decades. The great transformation in the circuits of internationalization and financial
globalization is expressed in the world market through new players and nonbank financial
institutions that encompass a large range of institutional investors: insurance companies,
investment funds, money market funds, hedge funds, special purpose vehicles, and private equity
funds, which modified the behavior of development financing and redefined the objectives of
financial institutions and banking systems on a national level.3
The global financial space became a single market where, for more than two decades, high-
risk financial instruments had been traded on the basis of profitability afforded by the prevailing
interest rates in international markets.4 The purchase and sale of contracts for financial services
grew exponentially over a short period. Growth was not only exponential, but the purchase and
sale of financial operations also extended the time frame for their execution. This time schedule
for transactions in the securities market and stock market led to a deepening of financialization
within the international financial circuits.5 Meanwhile, the role of central banks was subordi-
nated to the transformation of the financial circuits, ensuring a margin of capital efficiency to
the new players in the financial sphere, controlling interest rates and inflation (Lavoie 2010: 2;
Toporowski 2009: 37).
On the one hand, an interventionist state deregulated and liberalized the economy, whereas the
objectives of the central bank, namely, inflation targets and deregulation and liberalization of
national financial systems, controlled the financial order based on the needs of international
financial capital. Rating agencies took precedence over national interests in accordance with insti-
tutional investors. The importance of rating agencies even surpassed that of international financial
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB),
institutions that had been the pillars of international monetary regulation from 1944 to 1971.6
This new market setting, where rating agencies have an influence on nation-states that operate
based on financial innovation, was instrumental in the development of the current crises and
parallel financial system (Girón 2012) or shadow banking system. This parallel financial system
also emerged as a significant offshore device used to evade taxes and it was an active force behind
financialization. At the same time, the financial instruments resulting from financial innovation
allowed huge profits even before the financial crisis. These instruments were traded for their high
profitability and re-created the financial debt bubble in the period of a credit boom, which led
to a dramatic increase in financial products. Nevertheless, changes made to financial deregulation
and accelerated securitization have increased the size of the financial sector, have increased
instability, and have tended to generate endogenous boom-bust cycles (Minsky 1986). These
cycles have not been experienced in the same way by all countries due to differences in
their financial systems. Some have had financial markets as pillars and others banking markets;
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moreover, they can be characterized by the way in which they have participated in growth and
development financing.
From a long-term perspective, the Latin American external debt crisis was a result of the
financialization process. According to Stockhammer (2012: 57), this was a typical exchange rate
crisis preceded by a strong period of large capital flows that triggered their sudden exit.
The struggle of big transnational banks for profitability and valorization of financial surpluses
in the Eurodollar market resulted in large loans to borrower countries, such as Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico. In the long-term perspective, there is no doubt that the European and Latin
American crises resulted from the postwar transformations of the financial system, whereby
excessive growth led to financial fragility.
The increasingly frequent and severe European crises of the past decade represent a period
that is somewhat analogous to the Latin American experience of the 1980s. Between 1982 and
1983, production and employment in Latin America fell, its gross domestic product (GDP)
growth rate was 17.32 percent in 1982 and 9.57 percent in 1983, and unemployment rose
from 8.8 percent in 1982 to 11.0 percent in 1983. Meanwhile in the Eurozone, GDP dropped
from 2.34 percent to 1.05 percent during the critical years of 2008 to 2012, 2009 being the year
with the biggest downturn 3.69 percent. Unemployment increased from 7.7 percent in 2008 to
12.1 percent in 2013, its highest level.
In the 1990s, before the current crisis in Europe, governmental liquidity injections allowed
credit levels to rise. From 1993 to 1995, a recession began, mainly in the information and arms
industry. In this case, the fall in interest rates to below the inflation rate and the increased central
bank liquidity were unable to prevent a credit crunch, with the European monetary system suf-
fering a cataclysmic event by 1995. All of these factors multiplied risks and increased debt issu-
ance. According to Minsky (1986), to avoid a sequence of debt deflation and depression, “big
government” participation is needed to accelerate spending. In this situation, the budget deficit
would rise, allowing private balance sheets to strengthen as a result of larger government spend-
ing and tax cuts, therefore avoiding crises. Still, there is a risk in believing that the only remedy is
a large short-term fiscal stimulus. The more sustainable solution involves massive government
spending during a depression period to increase effective demand, to be followed by sustained
longer-term fiscal stimuli to ensure the continued operation of unused plants and equipment.
Other interpretations, such as that of Stockhammer (2012: 56–57), exist about the crisis of the
European monetary system during the 1990s. All these interpretations consider the crisis as a
determining factor for the eventual acceptance of a monetary union with the adoption of the euro
as a single currency, as well as a significant factor in the fall of the inflation rate and real rates of
interest. This was so despite differentials in inflation rates among countries, mainly Portugal,
Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain, vis-à-vis Germany.
THE MAASTRICHT TREATY AND THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL
BANK: PLAYERS IN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS
The origin of the crisis in Europe cannot be understood without mentioning the Maastricht Treaty
and the European Central Bank’s role in the Eurozone. Both have key roles and are orthodox
examples of economic theory becoming reality. Mundell suggested that to avoid exchange rate
crises, the world should be divided into optimal currency areas on the basis of some factor
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mobility criteria. He also emphasized that the biggest obstacle is political because of sovereignty
and symbols of identity of different national currencies. He pointed out that choosing a common
currency involves comparing the high costs associated with the existence of national currencies
and the benefits derived from optimal currency areas because larger amounts of national curren-
cies mean higher conversion costs and less efficiency in fulfilling money’s various functions.
Although Mundell originally favored a flexible exchange regime, he was inclined to suggest it
only for regions where factor mobility is poor (Mundell 1961: 662). Mundell emphasized
that a single currency implies a central bank, which in the European context required it to be
supranational. Thus, unlike the creation of the Federal Reserve Board and the national and inter-
national role of the U.S. dollar, Mundell’s theory laid the basis for financial fragility in Europe,
not only in the construction of the Eurozone but also for all those countries that gave up their
monetary sovereignty, with the issuing of the euro being dependent on the European Central
Bank (ECB) since the beginning of its creation.7
One of the most important points of the Maastricht Treaty, in Article 104—confirmed by the
2007 Lisbon Treaty in Article 123—is the rationale of how countries should obtain financing
through appropriate fiscal policies and the refusal of the ECB to finance the budget deficit of
the member states of the monetary union. The countries that formed the European Union lost
their monetary sovereignty at this critical juncture. The Eurozone accepted a central bank that
would indistinctively govern monetary policy in the countries comprising the currency area; yet
it could not finance public deficits. Based on the conditions outlined in the Maastricht Treaty,
countries would have to resort to financial markets for deficit financing. The size of these public
debts would depend on the decisions of rating agencies and financial markets’ funding, which
would be necessary to achieve growth standards in countries with asymmetrically structured
economies.8
Since the formation of the institutional framework of the European Monetary Union under
Mundell’s influence, the foundation was laid for the European currency to be financially fragile.
First, the monetary sovereignty of the central banks of the member countries became dependent
on a central body (ECB). Second, the ECB is independent of the political power of the European
Union member states. Third, private investors would have to provide for financing public
deficits. Fourth, only commercial banks would be financed by the central banks. Fifth, the
financing of companies and public administration is forbidden. (Guillén 2011: 115)
In this sense, Toporowski (2012) emphasizes that the Eurozone is the result of a deficient
institutional design due to the limitations that the Maastricht Treaty imposes, specifically the
restrictions imposed on government deficits, and also due to a bad combination of policies, such
as the requirement to keep the debt coefficient of GDP below a maximum level, which is impossible
for almost all countries to achieve simultaneously, especially following financial shocks.
The decision to respect the Stability and Growth Pact, which perpetuates and reinforces the
Maastricht Treaty criteria regarding public finances, is key to understanding the financial crisis
within the Eurozone. Unlike the causes of the U.S. economic crisis, the European crisis arose
from “a series of policy decisions that shook the real economy. Policies of a predatory nature
destabilized the real economy and this damaged the financial structure that sustained it, which
explains how we arrived at a capitalism of autonomous finances that violated the law of value”
(Parguez 2010: 214). In other words, the conditions for stability were violated over a long period,
provoking a “butterfly effect,” or the triple collapse of the Eurozone foundations: (1) financing
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during the prefinancial crisis period ignored the real economy,9 (2) European banks asked
for large sums in foreign currency—dollars, yen, Swiss francs—to recycle the borrowing of
non-European residents that were offered high interest rates, and (3) bankers violated
economic stability in order to sustain government deflationary policies that sought to reduce
the public debt. These three factors led to the collapse of much of the European banking sector,
with many of these banks having become insolvent following the international financial crisis.
Since the famous “Mitterrand conversion” of 1983, “a permanent shock therapy policy that
focused on getting rid of automatic economic stabilizers was applied, reducing public spending
and increasing taxes on the middle class” (Bliek and Parguez 2008: 30). European society thus
had to accept a decrease in state spending, which led to the disappearance of the welfare state.
Many sectors of the population saw their earnings drop and were forced to work in an informal
economy, where they had limited access to adequate educational, health, and cultural services.
The single-focused goal of achieving zero public deficits and generating quick surpluses to
pay off public debt led present and future generations into poverty. This was the birth of the
continuous application of economic austerity policies.
Given the negative macroeconomic consequences of austerity on the real economy, it was
impossible for any state to achieve the dream of zero public deficits, which accelerated deflation.
Far from a positive impact, these deficits may have had a negative result for the private sector,
where they affected profit flows due to negative expectations. Companies consequently reduced
employment, on the basis of expectations of more deflation (Parguez 2010: 219).
“DÉJÀ VU”: LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA
“Too big to fail, too big to rescue” transnational banks were the central players in the Latin
American story of debt. The massive liquidity of the Eurodollar market10 could channel
significant amounts of financing to countries whose import substitution model required
it, through large American, French, German, and Japanese transnational banks.11 Capital flows
to finance big infrastructure projects benefited countries like Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, and
military dictatorship spending in the Southern Cone also received financing.
The problem of Latin American external debt could not be understood without mentioning
Paul Volcker’s position at the U.S. Federal Reserve and Ben Bernanke’s position—as a
professor—regarding the “twin deficit” problem.12 The rise in interest rates to attract capital
flows influenced the external debt servicing costs of borrower countries. The Mexican govern-
ment’s inability to meet its external debt-servicing commitments led to a default in August 1982.
The IMF, the World Bank, the Federal Reserve, and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
quickly responded by providing a bailout to prevent default. Before the Brady Plan, external debt
negotiations and austerity measures implemented by the IMF resulted in capital outflows of
$64,253 million, which represented 67 percent of Mexico’s external debt in 1984. GDP fell
by 3.49 percent. The 1980s became the “lost decade” for Mexico and Latin America.
The strategies to solve the external debt problem, reduce the debt, and achieve economic
growth included: “rescue loans,” a “race against time” in renegotiations to postpone payment
and allow time for the large transnational banks to cover bad debts, “structural adjustment with
growth” or cross-conditionality of the IMF, World Bank, and the Baker Plan—which promised
loans of $20 billion to the fifteen countries with the most debt and created a new mechanism
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called the “market options list” as a way to transfer debt into bonds, after discounts—the
implementation of the Brady Plan, renegotiations, and restructuring of external debt and debt
swaps.
The Brady Plan was proposed at the end of the 1980s when the Mexican government
suggested that no debtor could continue paying its creditors unless there was economic growth.
The Venezuelan government implemented a severe adjustment program in 1989 under IMF
guidelines, disrupting the existing social order. In response, the U.S. Treasury Department intro-
duced the Brady Plan, which would be implemented for the first time in Mexico in the early
1990s, and later in Chile, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. In Venezuela, the neoliberal policy failed,
while Argentina and Mexico renegotiated their debt with the Paris Club in 1989 and 1991, for
$4.15 billion and $2.4 billion, respectively.
The Brady Plan was an international strategy for debt management that incorporated its own
approach to achieve a market solution. This plan was aimed at a direct and extended gravitation
of the international financial institutions into the private market in order to alleviate the debt
service of the most indebted countries. The main objectives were to reduce the transfer of funds
abroad by reducing principal and interest, and to channel new credits to stimulate national
economies.
The main mechanisms and techniques to reduce debt included in the Brady Plan consisted of
combining several credit instruments to convert liabilities into capital and make operations in
secondary markets and in the voluntary market of external debt to reduce the principal and ser-
vice of the debt. Buyback operations for repurchasing debt in secondary markets allowed
indebted countries to cancel debt with discounts. The purchase of zero coupon bonds (through
the acquisition of U.S. Treasury bonds) was useful to exchange the old and new debt equally.
Exchange of debt-equity swaps was also applied in secondary markets. Loan conversion practice
consisted of the exchange of one loan for another and was employed to substitute debt, which
allowed some banks to sell their participation in certain countries. With this debt conversion,
loans were transformed into capital or interbank debt and also into bonds emission in inter-
national markets (Girón 1995: 110–12, 128–35).
In this way, private firms and the public sector in Latin American countries during the 1990s
went back to the Eurobonds markets, financial capital returned with foreign direct investment
starting to flow again, and portfolio investments in stocks and banks were being channeled
through American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil were the major
negotiators of foreign debt under the Brady Plan, although other Latin American countries such
as Chile (1990), Peru (1995), and Uruguay (1991) also adhered to this strategy.
In 1990, Mexico entered into an agreement for $48 billion with the creditor banks and the
results were: (1) 47 percent of the total ($22.56 billion) was subject to a reduction in interest
rates from 9.81 percent to 6.25 percent (reduction of $7.75 billion for par bonds), (2) 41 percent
of the total ($19.68 billion) was exchanged for bonds at a discount of 35 percent of their value,
representing a decrease of $7.2 billion, and (3) 12 percent or $5.76 billion corresponded to new
loans (ECLAC 1990: 112). In this case, the signing of the Brady Plan and the debt renegotiation
with the Paris Club contributed to the reduction of principal and interest, as well as to the entry
of new financial flows and the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement. All of
these factors influenced Mexico’s growth.
In 1992–93, Argentina restructured $21 billion in medium and long-term debts, $7.8 billion
corresponding to interest payments. The debt restructuring was carried out under the following
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measures: (1) a discount bond swap for 35 percent of their value, (2) a swap paying a margin of
13/16 percent above LIBOR, and (3) a swap for thirty-year bonds paying a fixed maximum
interest rate of 6 percent. This agreement represented an immediate $1.5 billion reduction of
the debt plus interest payments. In addition, the government restructured another batch of debt
as follows: (1) a swap with international commercial banks for $20 billion in medium and long-
term debts for thirty-year par bonds, (2) a swap involving $7 billion of discount bonds at 65
percent of their value, paying interests at 13/16 percent above LIBOR, (3) $13.5 billion
exchanged for par bonds paying 4 percent interest in the first year and 6 percent in the sixth
year, and (4) a $700 million cash payment to clean out $8 billion in back interest and cover
the rest with bonds issued at floating rates (Girón 1995: 111–12).
In 1994, Brazil issued bonds that were valued at approximately $43 billion under the Brady
Plan, which was a measure that helped restore its access to capital markets while trying to curb
high inflation rates and overcome economic recession. In 2006, the Brazilian government
repurchased all of the Brady bonds issued in 1994, covering the $6.64 billion corresponding
to the nominal value of the securities.
The result of applying different strategies to solve extreme external public indebtedness
implied a structural change for Latin American economies and their reintegration to global
financial circuits—as will certainly happen to Europe—under a new face of the capitalist finan-
cial system. These changes were also due to the new international division of labor, where key
sectors of underdeveloped countries assumed a role different from the one they played during
the international accumulation process of the earlier postwar period.
The relation between the state and finances in Latin American countries was modified in the
1980s, going from favoring industrial entrepreneurs to emphasizing financialization driven by
increased interest rates that encouraged financial activities and discouraged productive invest-
ment by raising credit costs. In the Latin American context, this occurred with high and volatile
interest rates. Banks stopped providing credits to firms and instead granted them to governments
that underwrote and issued highly profitable debt bonds. Industrial profitability fell and, due to
low investment, was unable to recover, as occurred in some developed economies and Southeast
Asia with the use of more intensive technology.
Nonetheless, in the 1990s, with a more liberalized market, Latin American countries
regained access to international financial markets and began to finance their debt service mainly
through capital inflows. In the beginning, these capital flows covered their negative entries in
the commercial balance, while debt interest and capital amortization were financed through
bank lending and direct financing from international financial institutions. In the first decade
of the twenty-first century, Latin American economies managed to reverse negative items in
their current account balances, but this was accompanied by a drastic drop in direct investments
due to less-than-satisfactory coverage of financial needs.
EUROPE REPEATS LATIN AMERICAN AUSTERITY POLICIES
In the 1960s, Milton Friedman’s monetarist ideas (Friedman 1962, 1966; Friedman and Schwartz
1971) started to flourish among Latin American governments and they began to distance
themselves from Keynesian thought. It was not a matter of chance that there was a resurgence
of dictatorial governments in the region between the 1970s and 1980s. The emergence of such
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economic policymakers was backed by the entrance of the IMF and its indiscriminate austerity
programs, which led to a deep decline of GDP, as is happening now with the so-called GIIPS
countries of Europe (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain).
This is why it is important to revisit Kregel (2006), who stated that developing countries
were obliged to adopt Ponzi financing profiles that were inherently unstable. The structural
changes in Latin American economies and the renegotiation of external debt of debtor countries
corresponded to some extent to a new articulation of the capitalist system. This was the result of
a new international division of labor, in which the financial circuits and the world economy
sought a restructuring of transnational capital so that key sectors of developing countries would
play a principal role in the international accumulation process, different from that established
during the earlier postwar period. The priority is now to ask ourselves whether the public debt
haircuts in Greece and the general stability plans in GIIPS economies—an attempt to reduce
fiscal deficits—will enable these countries to resume growth without facing insolvency risks
or casting doubt on alternative debt solutions; or whether Greece will remain in the European
Economic and Monetary Union as well as the broader European community.
The economic policymakers were guaranteed by the entrance of the IMF and its indiscrimi-
nate austerity programs that caused a deep fall in GDP as is currently happening in the GIIPS
countries. The GIIPS economies are in a similar situation to Latin America during the lost decade
of the 1980s. This can be seen in the comparison in Table 1 of annual GDP growth rates in the
1980s in Latin America and the twenty-first century for the European Union and the GIIPS coun-
tries. The external debt crisis in underdeveloped countries happens when the rise in interest rates
is combined with the fall in the price of their export products. Table 2 offers a comparison of debt
levels in Latin America and Europe, with emphasis on Mexico and Greece.
TABLE 1
Gross domestic product (annual rate of change)
Period
Latin America
(current prices)
Latin
America (PPP) Period
GIIPS
(current prices)
GIIPS
(PPP)
Eurozone
(current prices) Eurozone
1982 1965.68 5.59 2002 5.68 1.92 9.11 2.46
1983 9.57 0.93 2003 13.83 2.17 23.27 2.73
1984 4.09 7.57 2004 9.51 3.03 14.51 4.86
1985 8.17 6.30 2005 3.20 3.05 3.83 4.86
1986 1.02 6.01 2006 4.36 4.06 5.98 6.43
1987 6.39 5.90 2007 9.88 3.50 15.10 5.72
1988 12.68 4.44 2008 6.43 1.07 9.90 2.34
1989 13.32 4.78 2009 6.22 2.55 8.65 3.69
1990 11.24 4.24 2010 2.76 1.06 2.10 3.19
1991 7.10 7.20 2011 3.70 1.10 7.80 3.58
1992 9.41 5.58 2012 6.21 0.43 7.02 1.05
1993 12.21 6.44 2013 1.70 0.10 4.30 1.04
1994 13.32 6.99 2014a 3.07 1.56 5.50 2.71
Average 157.9 5.5 Average 3.6 1.5 6.3 2.9
Source: International Monetary Fund, Database from World Economic Outlook 2014.
Notes: Latin America average includes twenty countries. The term GIIPS includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain. Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation of country GDP.
aEstimates for 2014.
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The accumulated value of public debt requires transferring the resources to creditors,
generating a removal of financing and economic decline, which is difficult to reverse in the short
term. This then leads to economic policy adjustments, which divert resources from new
infrastructure, public services, education, and health as well as from the productive sector. Thus,
the structural features of the peripheral European economies are undergoing transformations
similar to the changes that occurred years ago in the Latin American countries. Unemployment
and household debt are worsening; poverty rates reflect the pauperization of the middle classes
and the economic destitution of formerly poor sectors to levels previously unseen in Europe.
In Mexico and Latin America, financial investors posted huge profits during the debt-
refinancing process by taking advantage of financial opportunities provided by two U.S. govern-
ment initiatives to restart economic development, which were to alleviate the impact of external
debt and to enable some countries to once again float their securities in international capital
markets. A series of measures converged to face the payment of sovereign debts, mainly of
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Payment alternatives dramatically influenced Latin American
growth. These alternatives were adjustment plans, associated with severe cuts to public spending
and employment. The first measure was the Baker Plan, intended to ease the burden for the most
exposed commercial banks. Later, this plan completed the cleanup, associating investment funds
with the emergence of a secondary market for risky securities. Thus commercial banks were able
to restore their profits, even on bonds that had been downgraded to their original value on the
balance sheets, and transferred the riskiest repurchase agreements to marginal holders.
The external debt burst culminated in the so-called lost decade and would continue for the last
five years into the 1990s (1995–1999). The measures taken to reactivate the countries mentioned
above were: first, reduction of the total amount of debt; second, debt cancellation; third, cut in interest
rates; fourth, financial reform within the framework of the Washington Consensus; and fifth, central
banks’ goals would be reduced to inflation control instead of economic growth and development.
TABLE 2
Government consolidated debt (percent of GDP)
Period Latin America Mexico Period GIIPS Greece Eurozone
1982 24.7 21.4 2002 38.09 101.66 68.075
1983 27.3 23.9 2003 41.01 97.444 69.262
1984 27.6 23.8 2004 42.67 98.862 69.674
1985 26.9 23.5 2005 42.71 101.228 70.32
1986 27 25.1 2006 42.79 107.469 68.656
1987 28 25.1 2007 43.01 107.232 66.425
1988 27.3 24.3 2008 46.83 112.902 70.265
1989 27.0 22.1 2009 49.07 129.688 80.07
2010 53.48 148.329 85.738
2011 58.43 170.32 88.106
2012 60.67 153.496 92.772
2013 65.35 168.467 95.207
2014 68.24 169.275 95.585
Sources: Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat ec.europa.eu/) Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC). International Monetary Fund (2014). Database of World Economic Outlook.
Notes: Latin America average includes twenty countries. The term GIIPS includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
and Spain. European Union average includes twenty-seven countries.
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In Latin America, economic policy choices to solve the increasing external debt in the 1980s
were such that lessons can be drawn for those peripheral countries of Europe facing increasing
debt problems. Indeed, the problem may even be more acute for Europe, because while Latin
American economies held debts that represented almost 30 percent of GDP, European economies
have surpassed 60 percent of GDP. Economic policies to face external debt service with creditor
banks had a bearing on the name of the “lost decade,”which the Economic Commission for Latin
America (ECLA) designated for those years. This is why we are obliged to ask ourselves if the
measures taken by the IMF, the ECB, and the EU are adequate, and also if it is even convenient to
keep a single currency.
The same restructuring strategy has been used by the GIIPS countries since May 2010, when
the Stabilization Fund was created. The ECB used this fund to repurchase defaulted securities
from banks, with heavy subsidies for interest rates. In the first quarter of 2012, the fund was
expanded and strengthened in the Greek debt-swap agreement accepted by private investors,
mostly banks. Reduced bank portfolios and debt haircuts reached 53 percent of the nominal
value of the bonds, with losses nearing 75 percent. According to the European Banking
Federation (EBF), the banks took some time, not enough though, to discount their losses.
Today Greek bonds held by private investors are worth about 21.5 percent of what they were,
in accordance with an agreement to restructure the country’s debt. The pact between Greece and
the investors, through which the latter agreed to a 53 percent haircut, a reduction in the nominal
value of bonds, will therefore translate into actual losses of 78.5 percent for all banks and
mutual funds holding Greek debt securities. This is because the final loss not only contemplates
the nominal 53 percent haircut but also calculates the real current value of the bonds received in
the swap exchange, taking into account the term, interest rates, and other factors (BIS 2014).
This final 78.5 percent loss is deducted from the result of the credit default swap (CDS) auc-
tion that set the value of Greek bonds at 21.5 percent. The insurance companies will thus pay
78.5 cents for every dollar in Greek bonds that were held by the insured investors, especially in
hedge funds, for which a total payment of about $2.5 billion—or €1.89 billion—will be made
for this agreement, according to different market valuations.
Default insurance will be activated because the investors who had this coverage refused to
assume the debt reduction voluntarily, but were forced to. Athens managed to come to an agree-
ment with the large international banks for a 53 percent reduction on all Greek debt held by
private investors, which involves about $206 billion, through a bond swap that exchanged
the existing bonds for others. This agreement with creditors cut the Greek debt by €100 billion.
This measure is linked to the injection of €130 billion in loans by Eurozone countries and the
IMF, which contributed €28 billion.
The vast majority of private creditors accepted these losses, but investors with debt securities
worth €25 billion tried to reject the deal and were also forced to accept it. Greece was able to
do so by activating some collective action clauses (CACs), which implies that if the holders of
at least two-thirds of the debt agree to the haircut, the rest will be required to follow suit. The Inter-
national Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), an organization of hundreds of financial
groups that sets the rules of the derivatives game, ruled that there had been a “credit event” or
de facto default in Greece, once the CACs were activated, which has led to the payout of CDSs.
Regarding public debt in the GIIPS economies, the current financial situation of European
transnational banks (German, French, British, and Spanish) and institutional investors is
much worse than it was in Latin America in the 1980s. The European situation facing
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financial circuits and investors is exacerbated by the insolvency of firms, a danger that has
not been limited to the “stress tests” previously performed to simulate situations of economic
collapse. Debt in peripheral European countries has reached an unprecedented level, in part
due to massive fiscal imbalances—despite all measures taken and the fact that Spain and Italy
are promoting fiscal consolidation, but also because the banks have not been able to transfer
their credits—loans and guarantees—to third parties. These conditions have led the European
Parliament to ban short-selling transactions of default insurance linked to sovereign debt, the
so-called credit default swaps,13 and to tighten rules on the short-selling of stocks and
bonds.14
In addition to the reasons outlined above, the fact that first world countries are highly in
debt (France 81 percent of GDP, Germany 80 percent, Japan 220 percent, the United States
91 percent) prevents the simple management of GIIPS debt. At some point, holding so much
debt became a time bomb for developed economies. The G-20 asked for an increase in IMF
resources to help the Eurozone, and the European Union was forced to strengthen its
rescue fund for indebted countries from €500 million to €700 million, plus an additional reserve
of €240 million available for emergency situations. The latter was only effective until
mid-2013.
However, using the Brady Plan for Greek or European debt issues leads merely to imple-
menting deflationary policies that often run counter to continuing with refinancing programs.
The idea is to sustain the debtor with new bond issues in the hope of easing the future debt
burden. Although such plans appear to provide greater consideration to debtors, these initia-
tives are based on the same demands of privatization, cuts in social spending, and modifica-
tions to pension policies. Far from reducing the financial burden, these programs only solidify
the debtor country’s dependence on banks. It is therefore wrong to assume that this refinan-
cing will be more palatable if applied in conjunction with measures to regulate finance, con-
trol financial speculation, or eliminate tax havens. Nor will Greece be able to find relief
simply by reducing interest rates, as long as payments to creditors remain in progress. The
size of the debt is so monumental that even with continued 8 percent annual growth for
twenty years, Athens would be unable to reduce its liabilities to the levels initially stipulated
by the European Union. It therefore would appear that Greece is merely delaying its final dec-
laration of insolvency, as was the case for the indebted Latin American countries.
Latin American lessons for Europe represent not only a lost decade but also the precedent for
generating later crises. The relations between indebted countries and big creditors were limited
to stabilization plans oriented to external debt payment. Austerity measures were accompanied
by galloping inflation, as Table 3 shows, a situation that has not been experienced by the
Eurozone.
Public deficit reached levels that exceeded the payable capacity of a country, even when
public spending was reduced drastically, and increasing unemployment also occurred at the
same time as a fall in wages.
Adjustment plans along with different renegotiations canceled the Latin American “import
substitution” model and reinforced dependence once again on primary exports. More
renegotiations took place between banks and governments up to the appearance of the Brady
Plan in 1989.
Democratic governments approved the Washington Consensus on the basis of the
deregulation, economic liberalization, and financial liberalization framework, which established
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the foundations for the Argentinean, Brazilian, and Mexican banking crises. The financial
reform established central bank autonomy and contributed to the nondevelopment path, a path
characterized by inflation control, increased inequality, and foreign appropriation of the pro-
ductive and financial sectors. The deregulation process and financial liberalization along with
TABLE 4
Unemployment rate
Period Latin America Period GIIPS Eurozone
1982 8.8 2002 9.2 8.6
1983 11.0 2003 9.3 9.1
1984 9.3 2004 9.0 9.3
1985 9.6 2005 8.3 9.2
1986 9.9 2006 7.6 8.5
1987 8.6 2007 7.2 7.6
1988 7.0 2008 8.6 7.7
1989 7.1 2009 12.1 9.7
1990 7.5 2010 13.6 10.2
2011 14.8 10.2
2012 17.7 11.4
2013 19.1 12.1
2014 11.9
Average 8.8 Average 11.4 9.6
Source: International Monetary Fund, Database from World Economic Outlook 2014.
Notes: Latin America avergae includes twenty countries. The GIIPS includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and
Spain. Latin American average includes twenty-seven countries.
aData up to August 2012.
TABLE 3
Annual inflation
Period Latin America Period GIIPS Eurozone
1982 91.77 2002 3.71 2.37
1983 119.36 2003 3.32 1.95
1982 136.74 2004 2.61 2.35
1983 127.45 2005 2.67 2.30
1984 68.18 2006 2.96 1.93
1985 168.43 2007 2.63 3.10
1986 263.50 2008 3.54 1.63
1987 439.40 2009 0.14 0.92
1988 352.68 2010 1.67 2.21
1989 131.06 2011 2.77 2.76
1990 156.70 2012 2.28 2.22
1991 224.99 2013 0.56 0.85
1992 137.80 2014a 1.01
Average 186.00 Average 2.0
Sources: International Monetary Fund, Database from World Economic Outlook 2014. Eurostat.
Notes: Latin America avergae includes twenty countries. The GIIPS includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and
Spain. Latin American average includes twenty countries.
aEstimates for 2014.
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the adjustment programs had a high economic, social, and political cost for Latin American
societies, as in the GIIPS countries today. The route of these economies was transformed,
productive chains were broken, many jobs were lost, and a significant portion of the population
was impoverished. But these countries at least had a central bank and could assert monetary
sovereignty, even though they belonged to the dollar orbit. This is not so in the Eurozone.
This is why the fall of employment in the GIIPS economies has been more severe than the
one experienced in Latin America throughout the 1980s (see Table 4).
Those hard lessons of the Latin American experience suggest that what is needed is a policy
shift in favor of Keynesian macroeconomic policy stabilization. Perhaps we ought to take up the
interpretations of Rudolf Hilferding (1910) and Rosa Luxemburg (1913) once more to have
a global vision of the crisis framed in the process of the internationalization of capital. The true
alternative response to the crisis in the Eurozone is to return dynamism to these failing
economies by a collective commitment to high employment via a public investment strategy,
which means taking up the ideas of Keynes and Minsky as indispensable.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system, when the U.S. dollar was decoupled from the gold
standard, provided the dollar with market liquidity. Yet it also laid the groundwork for the
current financial crisis by establishing a parallel or “shadow” financial system. For the next four
decades, new economic players such as pension funds, hedge funds, and rating agencies have
become the privileged domains for financial gain. A minimalist state and central bank policies
in favor of low inflation fit well with this dynamic.
In conclusion, we note that some theorists have called the origin of the crisis, the “Minsky
moment.”15 However, a final analysis reveals that the roots of the crisis are more closely
associated with what Minsky referred to as “money manager capitalism.” The world crisis that
was nurtured by these Minskian transformations and by what has also been referred to as
a process of financialization, in Europe has not only been accompanied by bank insolvencies,
but it has also raised questions as to whether the weakest countries in the periphery of the
Eurozone would be able to sustain their public debts and remain in the European Monetary
Union. Since 2007, bankruptcies throughout Europe have continued unabated, a trend that
has only intensified since the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
Social movements to counter these adjustment programs have changed the political
scene during the past few years. The current panorama is characterized by financial fragility,
unemployment, social demands, nonperforming loans, decline in average industrial production,
and a mortgage crisis. The ECB, IMF, and European Commission, known as the troika, are
a reminder of the Latin American experience and the close relationship between the Federal
Reserve Bank and the IMF in the 1980s, along with the resulting severe economic, political,
and social disasters.
The crisis in Europe is the result of an imbalance between core and peripheral countries
inherent to the European economic model. Buoyed by monetary unification and financial dereg-
ulation, core countries in the Eurozone pursued export-led growth policies, or more specifically,
“beggar-thy-neighbor” policies, at the expense of mounting imbalances and debt accumulation
in noncore countries. This is further worsened by the fact that during crises, governments
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must increase expenditures—even if only through automatic stabilizers—in order to mitigate
the fallout, even if revenues tend to decline.
The crisis is emblematic of internal imbalances between central and peripheral countries within
a financial architecture that proved unsustainable in the long run. Imbalances in a monetary union
are bound to occur when its member states are economically heterogeneous and different.
Therefore, part of the solution to the European crisis requires a profound institutional reform
of the euro and its fundamental principles, not simply a fiscal or financial reform. It requires that
debtor and creditor economies share the burden of recycling surpluses and an economic adjustment.
Countries with surpluses should organize a system whereby they recycle their resources toward
debtor countries in order to revitalize aggregate demand and production in weaker economies.
The true alternative response to the crisis in the Eurozone would be for Greece to declare its
insolvency and for the GIIPS countries to pressure the European Union to look beyond its
borders and generate new global capacity to restart the economy, breaking the chain of
adjustment policies imposed by the troika. Similarly, in Latin America the Brady Plan and
negotiations with the Paris Club demonstrated that agreements were needed to resolve tension
and avoid a prolonged deepening of the crisis. Currently, any plan aiming to stabilize the world
economy depends on agreements between the United States, China, Germany, France, and
Japan. It would appear that the Treasury and the U.S. government are not interested in this
route, preferring instead to turn back to the economic policies championed by Ronald Reagan,
Paul Volcker, and James Baker in the 1980s, a new Plaza Agreement.
The depth of the banking and financial crisis in Europe today demands a Keynesian perspec-
tive once again, and no doubt Latin America can be an important lesson for the mistakes it made
in facing its creditors and paying the service of external debt during the 1980s. This is especially
the case because the lessons that this region teaches us conform to a series of measures and
economic programs of a “neoliberal” type that deepened into a structural change of the import
substitution model and their cost seriously affected employment, income, and the standard
of living of Latin American families, as is now occurring in peripheral countries of Europe.
Transnational creditor banks of Latin American debt and the IMF played a decisive role in
the conflict over external debt. Although the European crisis is different, it is similar in certain
aspects such as the dispute over sovereign funds and the institutional investors’ interest in the
profitability of their sovereign debt titles.
FUNDING
This research is part of the Project “Financial, Global and Regional Competence: Post-Crisis
Financial Models” (IN301015) sponsored by DGAPA-UNAM.
NOTES
1. Since the time of Walter Bagehot, the central bank has had to guard the sole banking reserve of the country
to preserve it throughout all the variations of the money market and all movements caused by decisions in moments
of panic, such as what should be anticipated, in what amounts, and for what dates to fulfill its role as lender of last
resort (Bagehot 1968: 134).
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2. In the 1960s and 1970s, Minsky stated that financial fragility and instability were linked to the business
cycle and caused financial crises (1964, 1982 and 1986). Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis thus describes
the transformation of an economy with a robust financial structure into one with a weak financial structure. The
deterioration of credit conditions in the stage of economic growth encourages risk taking in order to acquire liquidity,
which increases instability and therefore leads to a financial crisis (a change from stability to instability). This situation
requires government intervention (Minsky, 1986:69–72).
3. The democratic task of the state consisted in the democratization of financial markets and workers’ pensions in
a context of austerity. Institutional investors who were able to increase their profitability through the financial market
managed pension funds. The transfer of pension funds from the state to the private financial industry was an undeniable
part of the financial reform. In many countries, this was undertaken within the framework of financial privatization, not
only of public banks and public services but also of institutions such as insurance companies on an international level.
4. These factors are, for example, globalization, labor force, and productive and financial capital mobility, as well
as the absence of an international state, international monetary exchanges, and development alternatives inside the
hierarchy of power between states and nations (Guttman 2010: 185).
5. As Toporowski (2010: 37) states, “Typically, banks and financial institutions respond to higher perceptions
of risk by restricting new loans, or charging higher margins over central bank interest rates. This reduces the liquidity
of small and medium-sized non-financial businesses which find themselves unexpectedly unable to roll over debts, or
having to pay prohibitive interest in order to avoid default”.
6. In 1971, the dollar was decoupled from the gold standard, thereby breaking the Bretton Woods Agreements and
transforming the international financial system. New economic actors were to prevail over the decisions of international
financial institutions. They were to be represented by institutional investors and rating agencies with a strong state and
central bank presence.
7. The beginning of the 1990s is significant because under the leadership of Germany and France—without the
participation of Great Britain—a currency zone was created with fiscal and monetary stringency in order to design an
economic and political strategy to deal with the influence of the yen in the Asian currency area and the influence of
the dollar in other countries.
8. Maastricht Treaty, Article104 and Lisbon Treaty, Article 123 prohibited uncovered authorizations or concessions
of any type of credit by the European Central Bank and by central banks of member states, called hereafter “national
central banks,” in favor of community institutions, central governments, regional or local authorities or other public
authorities, public rights organisms, or public enterprises of member states, as well as the direct acquisition of debt
instruments from any of them by the ECB or national central banks. Since the Treaty of Maastricht was signed, investors
have tried to satisfy the financing demands of banks, companies, and public administrations of sovereign countries and
member states of the currency area. This financing comes in the form of mutual funds, pension funds, and hedge funds.
On December 2011, Mario Draghi announced that the ECB would give unlimited credit to distressed European Banks
with three years validity. Draghi, president of the ECB, deactivated the financing crisis that many financial institutions
faced. Altogether, banks took over more than €500,000 million in loans and achieved more liquidity than they had
imagined. The ECB was also flexible about the acceptance terms for financial assets as collateral or guarantee.
This enabled institutions with high exposure to issue some of their most toxic assets, including vulnerable sovereign debts
on the balance sheet of the central bank, in exchange for money.
9. When the financial structure is based on the creation of credits, as is the case with the modern or current capi-
talist nucleus, the monetary circuit can collapse if one or some of the sectors or groups applying for a credit—state,
companies, families, or the network of foreign spending in the national economy—do not generate enough value or
income to repay debts to the banking system, while also investing and spending. Likewise if there is depreciation in
the real value of some assets operating as collateral. These conditions could lead to the collapse of asset prices or turn
these into negative values.
10. The Eurodollar market originated at the end of the 1940s when China, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia
decided to deposit their dollars in banks located outside the United States—London and Paris—for political reasons.
This took place at the time of the expansion of multinational companies and transnational banking with the recycling
of petrodollars in the 1970s. It constituted an integrated financial system with global coverage, made up of an inter-
national network of banks, branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates that accepted deposits and provided loans in strong
currencies—dollar, mark, yen, and pound sterling. The U.S. dollar represented 70 percent of transactions in this system.
Latin American debts in the 1980s were settled in Euromarkets, which is also a reason why Europe suffered a crisis
derived from the payment problems of Latin American countries.
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11. Until the mid-1960s, most Latin American debt was contracted with the World Bank, the International
Development Bank (IDB), and the Eximbank. Afterward, external debt underwent banking transnationalization,
mainly with American banks. As Rosario Green (1983, 636) said: “Provided with unprecedented liquidity, international
banks looked for new clients, giving rise to ferocious interbank competition, still reflected in a variety of pressures
on the users of funds”.
12. From 1980 to 1988, as president of the U.S. Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker implemented a restrictive monetary
policy and, at the same time, the Reagan administration instrumented an expansive fiscal policy—tax reduction and
public spending increase—achieving an important decrease in inflation and a real appreciation of the dollar of 40
percent. The problem in the 1980s was that the United States stopped being a creditor country and became a net debtor
in the international financial sphere. In this way, the costs of Reagan’s administration were associated with long-term
imbalance, high interest rates, huge fiscal deficits that increased public debt, and trade deficits.
13. In October 2011, the European Parliament banned short-selling CDS transactions. Previously there was no EU
standard that regulated such operations. CDSs are derivatives that cover the risk of a payment default on behalf of a coun-
try or company. They were directly related to the outbreak of the global financial crisis in September 2008. Within CDS
transactions, the most risky are those undertaken through “short-selling”—that is, investors do not have corresponding
bonds, and therefore they benefit from the coverage without really being exposed to the risk of default. It is precisely
these swaps that the new European regulation prohibits, with certain exceptions, because the European Security and
Markets Authority (ESMA) can authorize such operations within twenty-four hours before they are done. The justifica-
tions for their approval include situations in which the sovereign debt market “is not working properly” and when the
ban could have a negative impact on sovereign CDSs. Another argument for their authorization may be that interest
on sovereign debt has risen or is already too high, or that the restriction affects the amounts of bonds that can be traded.
14. Short-selling is when investors sell stocks with the expectation that they will decline in value and the intention
to buy them later at a lower price and profit from the difference. To sell short, in the case of both shares and sovereign
debt, an investor must have borrowed the corresponding financial instrument, have entered into an agreement to lend or
have an agreement with a third party whereby the latter confirms that the action is located and that they have taken steps
to ensure that the investor can have “reasonable expectations” that the agreement will be executed. In the case
of European sovereign bonds, there are special arrangements to notify regulators, and these have to be made only if
there are important net positions in European Union sovereign bonds.
15. The “Minsky moment” is when investors reach such a state of euphoria that banks and lenders extend credits
even to dubious borrowers. At this point, different financial instruments are created to participate in the euphoria
with greater profit returns than in the productive field. The need to profit rests on speculation that induces a Ponzi
effect until reaching its peak. From this point on, some begin the exchange of financial instruments for cash and risk
becomes real, associated with a drop in company stock prices. This is when panic breaks out, and with it the collapse
of financial institutions.
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